This paper explores the evolution of national planning in Mexico over the last ninety years. Whereas the initial import-substitution industrialization in the country focused too narrowly upon specific sites, later export-led industrialization has attended only to the global market. The former was more attentive to the immediate environment, while the latter is becoming more attentive to the world. However, the conceptualization of national planning processes must simultaneously recognize the dynamics of the economy at community, regional, national, continental, and global scales. After nearly nine full decades of promoting the positivistic search for political order and the dream of economic progress, the institutionalized national planning process of Mexico has evolved. That evolution is summarized here.
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for Mexican land reform in the twentieth century. During his presidency, Obregón resolved 650 claims totaling more than a half million acres, with another 400,000 benefitting from provisional allocation of another one and a half million acres (Delgado de Cantú, 1988: p. 238 ). Due to acrimony over the protection of the economic and property interests of citizens of the United States in Mexico, especially with respect to petroleum extraction, the Obregón administration was not recognized by the United States. Despite the assassination of retired General Pancho Villa in 1923, political order held. Calles (1924 Calles ( -1928 was the first peaceful transition of power since 1884. Calles was liberal in orientation but stern in manner. Following the precedent of his predecessor, he nearly doubled the amount of land converted into ejidos. Calles pushed agrarian reform as an "integral solution" to make the ejido a "productive entity" under a New Economic Policy (Delgado de Cantú, 1988: pp. 251-252) . That policy strongly favored the conversion of the communal ejidos into private property (Law, 31 December 1925) . Economic and political relations were improved when the United States recognized the legal sovereignty of Mexico, even with respect to petroleum concessions. Mexico dedicated itself to the development of "its own" economy.
The inauguration of President Plutarco Elías
In an effort to promote his economic and social agenda as a "visionary message" (Brito, 1991: p. 25) , Calles created the first National Economic Council (Law, 15 June 1928) "for the improvement and ordering of the social-economic conditions and finances of the country". Constructed as a broadly based but permanent consultative body composed of ministers, business and labor union leaders, it established the consultative tradition within the Mexican federal government.
When Calles more vigorously enforced the secular, indeed anticlerical, provisions of the constitution, conservative adherents of the Roman Catholic Church rose in opposition. The Cristeros Rebellion of 1925-1928 resulted in the assassination of the re-elected Obregón on 17 July 1928. As Calles could not succeed himself under the constitution, he sought to insert three successive puppet governments to complete Obregón's full term, and thereby earning for himself the economic and social development of the region and for the integration of its economy with the rest of the nation (Mendoza Berrueto, 1982: pp. 48-49, in translation) .
In fact, the governor of the state of Tamaulipas had established the first economic free zonein1858, with confirmation by federal law in 1861 (Fernández, 1980: pp. 94-95) . Initially, the United States was hostile to both population settlement and economic competition along its southwestern border. The wholesale conversion of the free zone into the international in bond industrial maquiladora was not to occur for another three decades. It is perhaps ironic that the "free zone", which originally sought to preserve the territorial patrimony of Mexico, mushroomed into such economic importance as to both blur the notion of a definitive international border and bind the economy of Mexico to that of the United States.
Under provisions of the 1930 national planning law, Rodríguez directed the Secretariat of Communications and Public Works to prepare the First Plan of the Government (1934) . The plan was narrow in scope, favoring infrastructure programming and control of land development. The plan was a short-lived precedent. The nation sought a more aggressive leader with both a longer and broader view of the nation.
National Planning and National Patrimony
Beginning with the presidential inauguration of 1934, each of eight Institutional Revolutionary Party candidates were elected and served their complete six-year terms of office. National planning processes were moved into the very center of government; i.e., national plans would become identified with the person of the president. Based on the initiatives of Calles, succeeding presidents first nationalized the essential resources and infrastructure systems, then gave full support to the creation of an autonomous economy through import substitution-industrialization.
Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940)
While campaigning for the presidency, Lázaro Cárdenas (1895 Cárdenas ( -1970 proposed the First Six Year Plan (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) as a platform which tied national planning to presidential priorities (Pérez Barbosa, 1981: pp. 56-64) . The plan was a blueprint for the nationalization of resources and infrastructure, the promoting of primary industries, and for import-substitution industrialization. However, the plan was both more candid in its assessment of Mexican social problems and more active in promoting social development. It promoted programs on alcohol and drug addiction prevention and educational programs stressing the position of Mexico in the modern world (Solís, 1980 (Solís, [1975 Delgado de Cantú, 1988: pp. 272-274) . This plan, more than any to follow, recognized the interdependence of economic and social development.
Following the conversion of the National Revolutionary Party into the Mex-DOI: 10.4236/cus.2018.63017 300 Current Urban Studies ican Revolutionary Party, Cárdenas mobilized political power under a "pact of union and solidarity" (Brito, 1991: pp. 28-29) . Cárdenas is remembered as the president who fulfilled the promise of agrarian reform, nationalized the Mexican patrimony, expanded the federal bureaucracy and established the financing mechanisms in support of industrialization. While rising through the ranks of the military during the Revolution, Cárdenas retained an extraordinary allegiance to the rural peasants. Seeking more to stabilize the rural political order rather than promote economic development, Cárdenas transferred nearly fifty million acres of land into communal ejidos; the total being nearly seven times greater than that transferred by Calles (Meyer & Sherman, 1991: pp. 598-600) . He supported the creation of a confederation of rural workers (Accord, 9 July 1935), underpinned agricultural investment through creation of the National Bank of Ejidal Credit in 1936 (Carrillo Castro & García Ramírez, 1983 ) and incorporated the participation of the agricultural sector within government in a mixed commission of public and private sector representation (Law, 18 December 1939) . The power of the traditional hacienda to regulate rural life had been broken. The rural Mexican peasant finally gained a part, albeit a very small part, of the national patrimony.
Within an eighteen-month period, Cárdenas radically expanded the public patrimony. First, he nationalized the railroads (Accord, 23 June 1937) . Then, already having created Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) (Decree, 12 April 1934) , he nationalized all seventeen petroleum companies (Decree, 18 March1 938). Finally, he subjected the entire electrical industry to government control (Law, 31
December 1938), leading to its full nationalization (23 December 1960) . The creation of state monopolies, especially in the petroleum industry, was viewed as essential to the future industrialization of the nation (Carrillo Castro & García Ramírez, 1983: 39-42, 179-83) . For Cárdenas, nationalization was a matter of principle, even though the exigencies of the Great Depression gave it a more pragmatic justification.
Under the Law of Secretariats and Departments (6 April 1934), Cárdenas gave structure and direction to the realization of his economic and social agenda. The president consolidated the responsibilities in the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit, including preparation of the national budget and accounting of national expenditure, and created both a Secretariat for Agriculture and Development and an Agrarian Department, the latter to implement rural land reform. Solís, 1980 Solís, [1975 : pp. 27-51). World War II intervened, and the next president had other pressing concerns.
Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946)
Much like his predecessor, Manuel Ávila Camacho had risen through the ranks of the military quietly, eventually serving as Minister of National Defense (1937 Defense ( -1939 . Unlike Cárdenas, however, the new president was both politically moderate and religiously conservative. His famous comment, soy creyente (I am a believer), indicated a relaxation of tensions between the secular nation-state and the Catholic Church. In response to rising costs of living and unemployment, Ávila Camacho promulgated the creation of the initially modest copper, zinc, mercury and cadmium, were essential to the war effort. The conflict, however, had serious and diverse implications for the nation. On the one hand, the dedication of raw materials to the war effort led to domestic shortages, and increases in living costs led to price controls during the war and during the economic recession following the return of peace. On the other hand, participation in the war effort, coupled with constructive relationships with, and investments from, the United States, promoted Mexican industrialization. The Law of Industrial Transformation (31 May 1941), which gave priority to the expansion of the intermediate and final manufacturing sectors, was followed by the Law of Industrial Property (31 December 1942), which required the registration of patents and trademarks. These laws indicated the initiation of "state-led industrialization", which controlled Mexican economic development policy for the following decades (Teichman, 1988: p. 33 ).
Much controversy accompanied the 1942 creation of the bracero program of
Mexican migrant labor into the United States under a wartime economy (Smith, 1991: pp. 307-308) . While it gave employment to the already marginalized Mexican rural workers, day wage levels never permitted significant savings to improve living conditions upon returning to Mexico. Despite the verbiage of participation in the war effort, Mexico tacitly admitted that its economy could not absorb the rural non-skilled population. Conversely, the labor unions in the United States, while overtly siding with their Mexican counterparts, feared the creation of a two-tiered labor system within the agricultural market. While its wartime utility was significant, the extension of the bracero program created 
National Planning for Import-Substitution Industrialization
Although official verbiage continued to define economic development as a means to a larger socio-cultural revolution, in fact, the revolution was over; it had become fully institutionalized. It was a time to "stabilize" development to assure both political continuity and economic success (Pérez Barbosa, 1981: pp. 80-83; Córdoba, 1986: pp. 318-319) . The direction was not one of true socialism but to fund industrial capitalism (Meyer & Sherman, 1991: p. 637 ) manipulated by the state. Massive industrial projects were complemented by huge infrastructure projects over the next decade and accompanied by the accelerated growth of the federal bureaucracy. In 1946, the dominant political party changed its named to the Institutional Revolutionary Party fusing apparently contradictory terms to reflect the new and future reality of Mexico.
Miguel Alemán Valdés (1946-1952)
Miguel Alemán Valdés (1902 Valdés ( -1983 was the first civilian president since Carranza, and he had no strong ties to the political military tradition of Mexico (Delgado de Cantú, 1988: p. 333 The federal government of Alemán Valdéz felt itself to have accomplished two essential objectives: stimulation of and control over economic development. It was itself capable of "flexibly planning" both the production and distribution of goods throughout the national economy (Ceceña Cervantes, 1983: pp. 95-96) . For all the real economic success, there was little distribution. Import-substitution industrialization had created a modern class of Mexican millionaires who, together with the new class of public bureaucrats, extended old patterns of corruption and flaunted their personal luxuries as symbols of national progress.
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958)
Sensitive to the excesses of the Aleman Valdez regime, PRI nominated and secured by a four-to-one margin the election of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1890 Cortines ( -1973 as president. Modest but hard working in manner, he demanded strict honesty and disclosure of personal assets of all public officials. His personal honesty reinforced the promise of "stabilized" development (Delgado de Cantú, 1988: pp. 363-364 Investment momentum was building, but mechanisms to distribute production and control prices had not produced a consumer market of sufficient and continuing demand upon which to base self-sustaining economic development.
Unlimited and non-selective protectionism contributed to creating expensive industry, of meager efficiency and of low salaries, with a high social and political cost. External trade-which would have given a guideline for solving indebtedness-moreover, confronted low competitiveness with our manufactured products (Carrillo Castro & García Ramírez, 1983: pp. 34-35, in translation) .
With the quadrupling of foreign investment (Guillén Romo, 1985: p. 74) , the central bureaucracy held to "an abiding faith" in the perfectibility of a system that would ultimately produce abundance (Meyer & Sherman, 1991: p. 648 ).
Moving to consolidate further presidential powers in economic affairs, Ruiz
Cortines created a Particular Secretariat of the Presidency and transferred the National Commission on Investment directly under presidential control (both, 29 October 1954) . These actions moved future planning processes into the center of the administration as a de facto "super secretariat" (Pérez Barbosa, 1981: pp. 84-87, 90-91) . Early in the following year, the Law for the Promotion of New and Necessary Industries (4 January 1955) clung to the strategy of import-substitution industrialization.
The Fourth Six Year Plan, often titled the National Program for Investment (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) , enumerated the conventional phrases regarding economic development, but included objectives of "improving the level of life of the population"
and "channeling financial resources... toward the resolution of major economic problems" (Ceceña Cervantes, 1983: pp. 99-103) . The replacement Program of Investments (1954) , sought higher coordination among public investments.
Program evaluation turned sharply more technical to address cost-benefit ratios, labor productivity, social benefit, risk management and employment level per project. Following evaluation by the World Bank, a "reduced" Program of Investments (1956 Investments ( -1958 retained commitments to education, health and well-being (Ceceña Cervantes, 1983: pp. 110-113) , but while the federal government was somewhat more sensitive to social problems, it had to face the limitations of macro-economic manipulation and reorient itself to tighter fiscal management. (Meyer & Sherman, 1991: p. 649 ).
Renewed Positivism and Economic Regionalization
As Mexico approached its fourth decade of national planning, both the World and Mexico entered a new period of change. The Cuban Revolution placed Mexico in an ambivalent position. On the one hand, sympathetic to the "authentic" political and economic revolution of Fidel Castro. On the other hand, Mexico was increasingly dependent upon foreign capital to energize its economic development (Guillén Romo, 1985: p. 75 ). The avowedly anti-communist orientation of the Alliance for Progress, touted as a new planning initiative for the democracies of South America and the Caribbean region, was greeted in Mexico with some cynicism. Mexico already had a thirty-year tradition of national planning. In the words of Guillén Romo, Mexico did not need "Uncle Sam to give us permission" to develop our own nation (Guillén Romo, 1985, p. 75) . Nevertheless, Mexico participated aggressively in framing the 1961 Accord of Punta del Este and garnered both the technical and financial support offered through the "peaceful revolution" sponsored by the Alliance. The Mexican government saw in the Alliance for Progress a crucial opportunity to attract (but to lesser degree control) foreign investment, achieve a stable balance of payments of imports to exports, stabilize prices for domestic goods and services and promote tourism. The more socially oriented programs of the Alliance were in part a response to the accelerating social change within Latin America, including Mexico. Concern for a more balanced pattern of development, as well as promotion of export trade, led to the economic regionalization of Mexico. Yet, national planning remained wedded to macroeconomics, industrialization and infrastructure investment, all reflecting a renewed positivism.
Adolfo López Mateos (1958-1964)
The presidency of Adolfo López Mateos (1910 Mateos ( -1969 (Meyer & Sherman, 1991: p. 652 Plan works, systems, and improvements… project the promotion and development of regions and localities, which the President may designate for major general betterment… coordinate the programs of diverse organizations of public administration, and study modifications, which ought to be made… plan and superintend public investment to the decentralized organizations and parastatal enterprises (Article 16, in translation).
The new Secretariat of the Presidency, together with the new Secretariat of the National Patrimony, and the existing Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit, constituted a "triangle of efficient administration" over planning for, budgeting of and supervision over all implementing secretariats, departments, parastatal enterprises and agencies, even to those at regional and local levels (Ruiz Dueñas, 1982: pp. 42-44) . National planning processes were to serve the Secretariat of the Presidency in the "control of public investment programs" of the several sectoral secretariats (Pérez Barbosa, 1981 Barbosa, , 1936 . (1962) (1963) (1964) , which gave very high priority to extractive, primary and selected secondary industries (Ceceña Cervantes, 1983: p. 124; Solís, 1980 Solís, [1975 : pp. 70-80). The narrowness of that plan was less than fully accepted by the reviewing World Bank Commission, which sought the expansion of scope in a Revised Plan (1963 Plan ( -1965 to include roads, irrigation, housing, education and the supply of systems for water and sewage (Ceceña Cervantes, 1983: p. 133 ).
López Mateos left the presidency enjoying high public esteem. He brought national planning under the direct control of the presidency and labored to overcome the inter-secretarial parsimony to secure both coordinated planning and coordinated development. Cárdenas had responded to social needs more than any other president had. However, the narrowness of political expression under the Institutional Revolutionary Party and the emergence of a new urban generation, one with no experience with the Revolution of 1910, severely tested the public order of the nation.
Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970)
Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1911 Ordaz ( -1979 and Development (Guillén Romo, 1985: p. 82 ).
The National Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1966 -1970 (1965 reflected the orientation of the immediately preceding plan and, in a larger It was the plan of the public sector, crafted by the Inter-secretarial Commission, and imposed upon the national economy (Ceceña Cervantes, 1983: pp. 140-147) .
Its true objectives were so well hidden that it came to be viewed as a "secret"
plan (Guillén Romo, 1985: pp. 80-82) . As the decade ended, and the resources committed to the Alliance for Progress withered, the alliance appeared to have failed to secure any meaningful social development. It was a tree, which bore no fruit (Guillén Romo, 1985: p. 84 ).
National planning processes turned their attention toward bureaucratic reform to administer planning better. The new regional policy for industrialization held several "contradictions in the intent to redistribute" productive capacity, employment opportunity and income (Palacios, 1989: pp. 21-55) . The nation suddenly found itself divided into eight grand "geo-economic zones" within which were some seventy "geo-economic regions", plus five "special (coastal) regions" (Ceceña Cervantes, 1983: pp. 147-148) . See cial Development, 1966 cial Development, -1970 cial Development, (1965 Fernández, 1980) . The industrialization of the border region, initiated as an "experiment" as early as 1933, was extended to other border and coastal regions.
Given the proximity of the United States, a peculiar economic relationship has emerged with respect to the manual assembly, In-bond maquiladora industry along the Mexico-United States border (Fernández, 1980; González Salazar, 1981; Ojeda, 1982) . Although not yet apparent, the "economic miracle" of Mexico was over; neither the polity nor the economy could be stabilized (Smith, 1991: p. 362 for another five years.
Prior to the inauguration, Echeverría Alvarez announced his intention to create a National Planning Council to:
… diminish the imbalance in the growth of the distinct zones of the national territory, to coordinate more efficiently the actions of the agencies of the Federal Executive among themselves and with both the public and private sectors in order to avoid duplication of efforts... [and] to go ahead with the administrative reform of the agencies of the federal government (Ceceña Cervantes, 1983: pp. 149-150, in translation) .
While the council never functioned, the proposal did carry within the direction of future presidential prerogatives.
Echeverría Alvarez abandoned stabilized development, seeking a transition to a presidency of broader, or "shared development" linking "welfare and investment" (Córdoba, 1986: pp. 319-320; Pérez Barbosa, 1981: p. 110; Smith, 1991: pp. 368-371; Teichman, 1988: p. 45) . Perhaps seeking to diffuse political tensions by reorienting government initiatives away from Mexico City, Echeverría Alvarez turned his attention to rural development, certification of land tenancy, economic regionalization, promotion of border region development and the decentralization of human settlements (Friedmann, Gardels, & Penick, 1980: p. 343 ). This orientation was reflected in the succeeding General Law of Population (7 January 1974).
In addition to specific authorization for the extension of roads and electricity into rural zones, four larger federal actions characterized the new administration. The creation of a National Institute for Rural Community Development and Popular Housing (20 February 1971) was quickly followed by reactivation of agrarian reform (Federal Law, 16 April 1971) . Following establishment of an inter-sectorial commission for ejidal colonization (Accord, 7 July 1972), the Committee for the Regularization of Land Tenancy (Accord, 20 August 1973) decided clear title to land to promote agrarian reform, on the one hand, and assure orderly and legal urbanization, on the other. The federal government was sensitive to the diminished quality of life, as well as to the political instability of illegal human settlements. Nevertheless, urban and rural migration continued.
In both urban and rural areas, the landless poor and marginally employed took occupancy of both public and private lands. Echeverría Alvarez employed the model of regionalization imposed by his predecessor to decentralize industrial development and begin the slow turn of economic development policy to an export orientation. By federal accord (24 December 1970), the National Finance Bank was directed to study and promote the creation of industrial parks and industrial cities near to "population centers, natural resource centers and ports". In both 1972 and 1973, inter-sectorial commissions were directed to promote industrial development of the northern border (11 May 1972; 26 June 1973) . These actions were accompanied by the exemption of tariffs and fees under the federal customs code for the maquiladora industry (31 October 1972) . By accord among federal agencies (15 March 1974), incentives were approved to induce the development of small and medium scale industries along the border. The diversity and breadth of these programs required other mechanisms for coordination. In 1975, both a National Commission for Regional Development (28 January 1975) and a Coordinating Commission for Industrial Policy in the Public Sector (8 July 1975) were created to provide for the planned integration and financial coordination of industrial development. In the following year, another decree created a broader National Commission for Industrial Development (17 March 1976) .
Only passing mention was made of the creation of state-level Promoting Committees for Socio-economic Development in the decree creating the National Committee for Regional Development. However, on the same day, by separate decree, twelve such committees were created in states, largely along the border and coasts (28 January 1975). These and the subsequently created promoting committees were charged with integrating industrial development opportunities with both natural and human resource potential (Ruiz Dueñas, 1982: pp. 47-56) . Industrialization, population growth and migration accelerated radical urbanization and induced increasing social polarization. Economic regionalization required systematic attention to both the planning of human settlements and the protection of local environments. Within the broad cascade of governmental action between 1970 and 1975, there were two succeeding Federal Laws for the Prevention and Control of Environmental Contamination (12 March 1971; 28 March 1973) and a Secretarial Regulation on the Prevention and Control of Water Contamination (29 March 1973) . While largely reactive in nature, these actions were among the first to recognize explicitly the environmental context of agricultural, industrial and urban development. The increasing focus on urban development was reflected in the General Law of Human Settlements (26 May 1976). In the month following, a presidential decree expanded the charge of the regional development commission to become the National Commission for Regional and Urban Development (28 June 1976). Regionalized economic development had been linked to decentralized urban development (Garza, 1989: p. 73) .
Effective promotion of economic development required simultaneous attention to international, as well as national, regional and local, levels. Promotion of regionalized economic development required both the coordination of domestic public funds and the control over foreign investment (9 March 1973; 29 May 1974; 5 November 1975) . While programs were implemented through the coor-dination of functional secretariats, they were bound to a unified budgetary process under the president. The entry of Mexico into the Latin American Economic System (Decree, 8 January 1976) indicated an expanding national assertiveness in international economic affairs.
For all this effort, Echeverría Alvarez did not secure economic equity for Mexico. Mexican industrialization did not produce revenues sufficient to raise social welfare. The new policy failed because there was very little to share (Teichman, 1988: pp. 49-56) . Governmental action failed to stem the outflow of Mexican domestic capital. At the conclusion of the presidential term, neither progress nor order was assured.
The roots of the problem were economic, but they had meshed with ideological postures and social realities to produce an unparalleled crisis of confidence (Meyer & Sherman, 1991: p. 675 ).
José López Portillo (1976-1982)
The election of the Institutional Revolutionary Party candidate, José López Portillo y Pacheco , held little cause for confidence. Nevertheless, the new president won a reprieve from immediate economic crisis with the discovery of vast new petroleum deposits in the states of Chiapas and Tabasco and under the offshore platform of the Gulf of Mexico. This was the last development "boom" for Mexico (Córdoba, 1986: pp. 320-328) . During his election campaign, López Portillo, as the head of the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit, argued that:
The problems of planning are fundamentally [ones] of coordination. Coordination presupposes an order, and order can only be given in a program in which responsible action and pertinent resources ought to be ordered in time and in space... (Ruiz Dueñas, 1982: pp. 59-60, in translation) .
Following the precedent of Cárdenas some four decades earlier, López Portillo employed the draft formulation of the National Basic Plan of the Government (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) as a political platform. The full version of the plan was two hundred and thirteen pages. A summary version of one hundred "principal" points was published in newspapers on 23 September 1975 (Ceceña Cervantes, 1983 ). In self-congratulatory language, the document asserted that:
... we can affirm that the federal public sector has reached the necessary maturity to undertake efforts of planning of a great order, under and for liberty (Ceceña Cervantes, 1983: pp. 200-201 , in translation, italics omitted).
Even so, the plan was little more than a "catalogue of good wishes", ones which the central government could neither implement by itself nor compel the private sector to cooperate with it (Guillén Romo, 1985: pp. 164-166) velopment, 1979-1982 (1978) included both a short-term (1979-1982) and long-term view (1982-1990) . The plan recognized that further expansion of the Mexican economy was bound to the sale of petroleum on the world market (Székely, 1983: pp. 78-84) . Although expressly seeking "to counteract oligopolistic tendencies in the industrial ambit", the plan could not avoid re-concentration of economic structure. Instead, the plan scattered such development largely to the periphery of the nation, while seeking to control industrial expansion surrounding the Federal District. See Figure 3 .
Following the bureaucratic tradition, López Portillo pushed ahead, seeking to create a "national system of planning" (Yáñez Garrido & Rodríguez Jiménez, Figure 3 . Decentralized urban industrial development of Mexico, 1979 . Source: National Plan for Industrial Development, 1979 Development, -1982 Development, (1978 . velopment (13 February 1981) . With the conversion of the former to the latter, the existing geo-political states became regions, and the union of regional and urban planning was fully institutionalized (Garza, 1989: pp. 9-24) . Decentralized industrial policy required both structural reform to assure coordination among federal agencies, parastatal corporations and private sector corporations, and a system of fiscal incentives to induce foreign investment (Moreno Padilla, 1980) . By 1978, Mexico had created and financed over 900 parastatal entities of which 294 were industrial enterprises, 149 were credit institutions, and 67 provided energy or transportation (Labra, 1984: pp. 54-56) . Coordination . Taken together, the several decrees were the implementing mechanism for the first phase of the National Plan for Industrial Development, 1979 Development, -1982 Development, (1978 . In early1980, to "overcome the crisis", Miguel de la Madrid, as Secretary of
Programming and Budgeting published a synthesis of thirteen concurrent sectoral plans and programs to form the Global Plan for Development, 1980 (17 April 1980 ) (Pérez Barbosa, 1981 Despite its "global appellation", the plan remained largely economic in character with its central objectives seeking to:
• Reaffirm and strengthen the independence of Mexico as a democratic, [and] just, nation, [with] a free economy.
• Provide to the population employment and basic well-being, with priority, attending to the necessities of nutrition, education and housing.
• Promote high, sustained, and efficient economic growth.
• Improve the distribution of income among persons, factors of production and geographic regions (Section 5, in translation).
The plan's twenty-two basic policies held some very strong implications. First, the association of urban and industrial development with a "new regional scheme" was to be emphasized along the "coasts and frontiers" of the nation. Second, agricultural production had to be controlled in order to provide a basic food distribution system for the poor. Third, the exercise of public power in the economic sector had to "promote priority expenditures and reinforce public en- 
Mexico was not inclined to further economic dependency upon the United
States by increasing petroleum exports. The discovery of new oil deposits attracted huge infusions of foreign capital, boosting both petroleum production and revenues to extraordinarily high levels, but the developmental vision of a renewed healthy and dynamic economy was tempered by three interrelated phenomena. First, the petroleum industry, no matter how large and productive, was capital-intensive, rather than labor-intensive. What labor it required had to be increasingly skilled. Second, agriculture, even when supported by both direct and indirect subsidy, could not produce basic food to keep pace with the population increase. Third, both the infusion of foreign capital and government in- Creditor banks agreed to a moratorium on both short-and medium-term debt While the president felt that he had defended the integrity of the Mexican economy, disclosures of his enrichment tainted his administration (Smith, 1991: pp. 381-382). Perhaps, he had nationalized the banks to assure an economic future for himself, his family and his associates.
Dissolution and Reordering
Since mid-century, Mexico had employed "monopolistic capitalism of the State" (Yáñez Garrido & Rodríguez Jiménez, 1986: p. 37 ) to induce, complement and manipulate foreign investment in support of national economic development.
The1982 nationalization of the Mexican banks was the last expansive act of the public bureaucracy. In fact, it was not done to develop further the national economy but to rescue it from internal collapse. It was the most severe crisis since that of the Great Depression (Teichman, 1988: p. 111 (Maxfield, 1992: pp. 87-88) .
Having served as Secretary of Budgeting and Planning (1979-1982) , he was fully aware of the task before him. He had to "stabilize" the nation, not for continuing development, but against imminent retrogression (Córdoba, 1986: pp. 328-345) .
The new government reformulated a number of old phrases to characterize its responsiveness to the continuing economic crisis "Revolutionary Nationalism", "Integral Democratization", "Egalitarian Society", "Moral Renovation", "Decen- Under a specific requirement of the 1983 Law on Planning, the National Plan of Development (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) Mining (1984 ) (17 August 1984 ), Development Financing (1984 (20 September 1984), and Medium and Small Industries (1985 ( ) (30 April 1985 . Social development was reintegrated by decree to include national programs of Ecology, ( ) (26 September 1984 , Urban Development ( ) (25 September 1984 , and System of Food Provision ( ) (27 September 1984 . These programs reflected concerns of a nation seeking to promote economic development, while sustaining social organization and preserving the environment.
While preserving the centrality of both the Secretariat of Programming and These provisions formally empowered municipalities to share in the implementation of planning at local levels; yet federal or state level transfers secured funding even for local projects. While the tension between federal level fiscalization of development and local level implementation of development continued, the planning process in Mexico had become more decentralized. Although economic and social crises appeared manageable in late 1985, a violent and incredibly destructive earthquake occurred during the morning rush hour of 19 September 1985 within Mexico City. The entire development budget for the year had to be allocated to provide for rescue, health services, food distribution, and demolition of damaged and dangerous structures. Economic and social development programs were paralyzed.
The closing years of the administration of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado were struggles that impeded both economic reordering and moral renovation. Inflation persisted, and the exchange rate between the Mexican peso and the US dollar had increased to 300/1 (14 October 1985) . Within another year, it grew to 800/1, and by December 1987, it had mushroomed to 2300/1 (Meyer & Sherman, 1991: pp. 686-687) . The tourism industry along the western coast and southern Yucatán boomed with American, Canadian and European visitors, but the internal economy was in full retreat. The federal government authorized the "fusion" of banks across the nation (28 October 1985; 19 December 1985) . By decree (12 December 1985) , Mexico through regulation of the Secretariat of the Treasury and Public Credit guaranteed the loans of nationalized banks under provisions of the agreements with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). In the last year of the de la Madrid administration, the Secretariat of Programming and Budget ordered the "dissolutions, liquidations, fusions and transfers of parastatal entities" in all major sectors of the national economy. These included construction and construction equipment (22 January 1988), fisheries (10 February 1988; 24 October 1988) , mining and mineral processing (3 March 1988), diesel engines (3 November 1988), and steel factories (22 November 1988) . The program of desincorporación proceeded slowly.
Of the 1115 publicly owned companies his government inherited in late 1982, de la Madrid managed by late 1986 to sell off 96, including some major ownings in the hotel and automobile business, to merge 46 and to transfer 39 to state governments. The government also closed down some 279 inefficient plants, including a large steel mill near Monterrey (Smith, 1991: p. 389 ).
The Law of the General Export Tax (8 February 1988) and the Law of the General Import Tax (12 February 1988) fully repositioned the national economy to export maximization. On 18 March 1988, Mexico celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the nationalization of petroleum (Carballo Balvanera et al., 1990) . There was little cause for joy as the national patrimony was shrinking; 1988 was a very different and difficult time.
Another problem reemerged in this very troubled time: illegal immigration into the United States. While the maquiladora industry continued to grow, its requirements for both young and moderately skilled employees could not absorb the masses of unemployed, underemployed, displaced and unskilled workers. The cities of Mexico were no longer refuges from poverty and isolation. Illegal aliens, perhaps those who remembered the bracero program, were forced to come to the United States to earn income for transfer back into Mexico. Others sought permanent residence and possibly citizenship. The 1986 passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act reduced the attractions, which "pulled" Mexicans into the US, but it could do nothing to reduce those factors, which "pushed" Mexicans out of their country (Meyer & Sherman, 1991: p. 691) .
A dispirited public had increasing difficulty believing in the moral renovation.
Economic collapse, social disorganization and environmental calamity exposed an impotent, incompetent or malfeasant central government. Despite well-publicized convictions of senior bureaucrats for embezzlement, the internal "climate of confidence" was not restored. The Mexican Comptroller General, Ignacio Pichardo, is reported to have suggested that "Mexican corruption was like garbage:
it had to be removed daily" (Meyer & Sherman, 1991: p. 686 ). When Miguel de la Madrid concluded his term, foreign debt had grown, national confidence had sunk and political crisis was imminent. The authoritarianism of the governing party, manifested as the "right to rule", came under direct attack (Bailey, 1988: p. 6).
Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994)
Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1948-) served as Secretary of Budgeting and Programming (1982-1988) . Seen as a Harvard University-educated technocrat and having never been elected to public office in Mexico, his "presidentialness" was (Meyer & Sherman, 1991: pp. 694-695) and was confirmed by the electoral college as president-elect (13 September 1988) . In an attempt to restore public confidence in the government, several of his presidential decrees and accords included the personal reference to "my charge" as president.
Salinas de Gortari was careful to consolidate his legitimacy through moderation, employing the anthem of "modernization" (Smith, 1991: p. 395 ). Administrative reforms were at first modest, but later turned to a bending of the public bureaucracy toward social development. Equally attentive to both local and international affairs, the president promoted both rural development and accele- The transition would be very difficult, requiring the reordering of the central bureaucracy to provide for basic human needs and underpin necessary social development. In May 1992, the Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology was dissolved, its former programs and certain functions assigned to the former Secretariat of Programming and Budget were incorporated into a new Secretariat of Social Development (Decree Reforming the Organic Law of Federal Public Administration, 25 May 1992). The new secretariat was to be responsible not only for programs directly targeted toward social development, but also for the larger processes of Urban Development, Regional Development and Environmental Protection (Internal Regulation, 4 June1992).
A Lowered Vision and a Diminished Role 1
As Mexico prepared to celebrate the quincentennial of the discovery of the New World, it had positioned itself for broader global economic participation. That orientation to economic development came with great internal cost. National planning processes held a lowered vision, one tied to the short-term processes of fiscalization by the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit. Even though the relationships among local environments and human settlements were the responsibilities assigned to the Secretariat of Social Development, that new secretariat had a diminished role with respect to the protection of larger ecological systems.
After six decades of national planning experience, Mexico was still wedded to the model that economic development led and supported social development, and that both occurred within a largely compliant environment.
Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000)
Ernesto Zedillo (1951-) was elected President of Mexico after the leading Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) candidate for President, Luis Colosio, on whose campaign Zedillo was working, was assassinated. Prior to campaigning for Colosio and then becoming the candidate himself by default, Zedillo served as Secretary of Education under President Salinas. Previously he had been Secretary of Planning and Budget Control, a role to which he was appointed at age 36. His career began at the Bank of Mexico after completing his doctoral studies in economics at Yale University, where his dissertation focused on Mexico's external debt (DePalma, 1994) . Almost immediately upon taking office, Zedillo's training as an economist was put to work when the Mexican economy plummeted.
The economic crash that hit within three weeks of Zedillo's swearing in as president is commonly referred to as the Mexican Peso Crisis or the Tequila Crisis. The crisis was caused by a confluence of factors. First, when Mexico replaced its inflation wrecked old peso with the nuevo peso in 1993 it attempted to peg the currency to the US dollar. In order to do that, the Mexican government issued public debt in US dollars and used the dollars to buy pesos on the open market to maintain the currency within a window of fluctuation (Lustig, 1995: p. 13 ). Leading up to the 1994 elections, the Salinas administration prioritized consumer price stabilization over other economic factors, and the government overreached its debt capacity. Zedillo came into office to find the government severely in debt with a repayment schedule in a currency that was not its own and with an artificially high peso that the Zedillo administration believed was slowing down foreign investment. The issues were compounded by recently increased yields on financial instruments in the United States that made Mexican investments less attractive to investors (Lustig, 1995: p. 11) . In order to incentivize investors and balance the federal budget, Zedillo announced a plan to devalue the peso by up to 15% (Lustig, 1995: p. 14) . Yet such devaluation, coupled with political and social unrest caused by the Zapatista movement in the State of Chiapas and the fallout from the assassination of the PRI's previous presidential candidate, led many institutional investors to liquidate their Mexican holdings all together, preempting a feared default by the Mexican government and political turbulence (Lustig, 1995: p. 17 (Lustig, 1995: p. 20) . While the government's debt crisis and the immediate capital flight it spawned was turned around by the bailout fund, the peso now floated freely on a market that saw its value continue to fall. By the end of Zedillo's six years in office, the Mexican currency hovered between 9 and 10 pesos per US dollar, roughly a 300% depreciation from before the crisis (Trading Economics, 2018).
The economic crisis had a long-term impact on the Mexican economy, one that would influence the agenda of Zedillo's presidency. Between 1994 and 1996, extreme poverty increased from 21 percent of the Mexican population to 37 percent (Pereznieto, 2010: p. 1) . The overall GDP decreased by 6.2% in 1995, and real wages fell by 18.5% (Pereznieto, 2010: p. 7) . Urban populations were affected most profoundly because they were generally reliant on a wage-based income to provide for basic needs, whereas rural households could rely on subsistence farming (Pereznieto, 2010: p. 10 (Pereznieto, 2010: p. 26; Alanís, 2003) .
Launched in 1997, PROGRESA provided monthly cash transfers to 2.6 million families by the end of Zedillo's term in 2000. Nearly all of those families were rural, and roughly two thirds were indigenous (La Razón de México, 2014) . State and local governments were generally responsible for the provision of education and health services (Alanís, 2003) . The rural focus of PROGRESA took shape within the context of political pressure from the Zapatista Movement seeking rural land reform (The Economist, 1998).
On December 22, 1997, two and a half years after 17 farmers organizing for land reform were killed by police, 45 unarmed sympathizers of the Zapatista Movement, including children, were murdered by assailants with connections to the PRI (The Economist, 1998). The two massacres placed political pressure on Zedillo to focus on rural concerns, but urban affairs were not completely forgotten.
Zedillo's approach to urban poverty and development concerns was primarily market based. The 1995-2000 PDN sought to incentivize private investment by moderating inflation. As Zedillo's administration struggled with this approach after the economic crash, it turned to privatization. Continuing the work of previous administration, Mexico listed for sale US$12 billion of assets, including railroads, airports, ports, petrochemical factories and satellites (Millman, 1996) . (Millman, 1996) . During
Zedillo's six-year term, the government only collected US$4 billion from its privatization initiatives, mostly from transportation related assets (MacLeod, 2004: p. 89). The few gains that the government made through privatization were completely wiped out by the US$115 billion bailout package that the Zedillo administration offered to private banks to stabilize the economy during the Peso
Crisis (MacLeod, 2004: p. 99 ).
While market-based mechanisms were slow to respond, Zedillo's government did invest directly in both rural and urban infrastructure. During Zedillo's term in office, the federal Secretariat for Social Development, or SEDESOL, transferred more than 56 billion pesos to municipalities for locally based, federally funded infrastructure projects (SEDESOL, 2000: p. 14) . SEDESOL was also responsible for overseeing a temporary employment program that brought mostly unskilled jobs to more than 5.6 million people to work primarily on reconstruction efforts after natural disasters (SEDESOL, 2000: p. 14) . Despite those efforts, a struggling economy and political pressure from the Zapatista Movement led to the PRI losing control of congress in 1997, foreshadowing a change in the executive branch.
Vincente Fox (2000-2006)
Vicente Fox (1942-) The plan lays out six axes of human development policies to achieve such a goal.
First to "break the vicious cycle of poverty" by continuing and starting programs to transfer economic resources and support education. The second axis described in the plan is to seek equity and equality in programs and opportunities for all Mexicans. The third axis is to foster entrepreneurial capacity. (PBS, 2001 ). Yet his support for agrarian reforms was quickly undermined when his administration announced plans to build a US$2.3 billion airport on communal ejido land outside of Mexico City. After violent protests in opposition of the proposed airport, the plans were dropped (Thompson, 2002) .
Economically, Fox was generally in line with his predecessor, seeking to incentivize private investment while insisting on not privatizing Mexico's most attractive financial asset-PEMEX (Shields, 2007 (Storrs, 2005) .
Seeking a concrete legacy, the Fox administration supported the construction of a US$100 million public library, the largest in Latin America (Kaysen, 2007) .
The project was funded and overseen by the Administrative Committee of the Federal Program of School Construction (El Universal, 2006) . A year after the ribbon cutting ceremony in 2006, the library was closed for two years due to design oversights that caused leaks and structural cracks necessitating multimillion dollar repairs (Ceballos, 2007) .
Despite limited successes of his own design, Fox marked a political shift. He was the first president from the PAN party. He would not be the last.
Felipe Calderón (2006-2012)
Felipe Calderón ( Over the course of his presidency, Calderón's administration oversaw the construction of 39 public hospitals and 132 clinics run by the Institute for Social Security and Services for State Workers (Arreola, 2012) . In tandem with existing hospitals and private investments, Calderón's public investment in hospitals brought near universal access to healthcare across the country (La Razón, 2012 (Proceso, 2008) . Through these two programs, the Mexican government supported six and a half million families with basic neces-sities on a monthly basis by Calderón's last year in office. Two other programs, Esta Es Tu Casa (This is Your House) and Habitat, supported over a million families with mortgage loans for homes and installed water and sewer connections for those homes (La Razón, 2012) . As part of the National Infrastructure Program, the government also updated the electricity grid with US$35.1 billion invested from both public funds and public private partnerships. Of that investment, over US$3 billion was directed to renewable energy sources such as wind farms and hydroelectric plants (Corta et al., 2007) . To increase support for public private partnerships, Calderón introduced the Law on Public Private Partnerships in November of 2009. The law, which did not pass Congress until January of 2012, gives private firms the ability to identify potential projects and submit proposals to the relevant government agency. If such privately initiated projects ultimately are put out to tender, the firm that submitted the proposal would be reimbursed for the cost of its feasibility study initially submitted regardless of which firm wins the final contract (Hanono, 2012) .
Economically, Mexico saw gains in employment figures largely due to NAFTA and other global trade agreements. Among the most significant employment sectors was the auto industry. Taking advantage of markets within Mexico and low-to-no tariffs for access to markets abroad, both Asian and American car manufacturers opened assembly and parts plants, directly employing tens of thousands of people (Associated Press, 2007; Smith, 2007) . Such global economic integration was at the heart of Calderón's vision for Mexico. Yet for the people still without jobs and for the low paid, Mexico has continued currency troubles made daily life a struggle.
To combat the effects of inflation and commodity speculation on the price of basic staples, Calderón's administration worked with major tortilla producing companies to form the Tortilla Price Stabilization Pact. First established in 2007 and later renegotiated in 2010, the pact used both legal threats and direct subsidies to create a price ceiling for consumers (Beltrán, 2007; USDA, 2010) . In addition to capping the price of tortillas, Calderón's administration also offered cash subsidies to companies hiring an employee entering the job market for the first time (CROSS, 2012) . The First Employment Program was designed in part to reign in outward migration to the US. Between its launch in 2007 and August of 2011, the program had registered over 83,000 workers within 22,000 businesses (CROSS, 2012 ). Yet Calderón's Secretary of Work and Social Provision, Javier Lozano, admitted that the First Employment Program is not sufficient to create jobs to fully employ Mexico's youth, "even with all of the federal budget" (Cantero, 2007) . Unemployment, outward migration and violence continued to present grave challenges for Mexico. Framing Calderdón's six-year term in office was a plague of violence that swept across Mexico. Criminal activities had developed into an all-out civil war. During Calderón's presidency, there were an estimated 60,000 murders across Mexico (Miroff & Booth, 2012) . This marked a three-fold increase in four years from less than 9000 murders in 2007 to over 27,000 in 2011 (Miroff & Booth, 2012) . Calderón deployed 50,000 federal troops alongside police to fight the gang and drug related violence across the country. With bodies dumped openly on streets and beheadings on a near daily basis, terror had made its mark on Mexico perhaps more profoundly than any highway infrastructure or hospital project could (Miroff & Booth, 2012) . In July of 2012, the electoral polls reflected that.
Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018)
Enrique Peña Nieto (1966-) was elected President of Mexico in 2012, marking a return to power for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Although he brought over a decade of experience within senior party and governmental positions, including as Governor of the State of Mexico, Peña Nieto campaigned as a fresh face for the PRI and for the nation (Carroll, 2012) . He overcame political gaffes, such as not knowing the price of tortillas that had been set by the Calderón administration, to win the presidency. He entered office promising, among other things, to curb violence, fight poverty and hunger, improve education, strengthen welfare safety nets and break up telecommunications monopolies (Carroll, 2012) . In total, Peña Nieto announced his vision to turn Mexico into a "developed country" (Rueda, 2012) . This vision was paired with the central strategy of the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (National Development Plan) -2018 : to "increase productivity in order to carry Mexico to its full potential" (Government of Mexico, 2012, in translation).
For the Peña Nieto Administration, increased productivity began in schools and carried through to industry; yet the success of reforms across sectors has been mixed. Peña Nieto introduced sweeping reforms for public education across the country with the aim of breaking up teachers' unions in order to reward good performance and to fire teachers deemed to be underperforming. In the 2012 Program for International Student Assessment, or PISA, 41% of Mexican students did not meet basic reading comprehension standards and 55% were below basic math standards (Canedo, 2016) . These failings are commonly attributed to poor facilities, high teacher to student ratios of 28:1 nationwide and corrupt practices of teacher hiring and assessment (Canedo, 2016) . The Education Reform Bill passed in February of 2013 attempted to address at least one of the major challenges facing education: teacher hiring and assessment.
Through the Education Reform Bill, the Peña Nieto administration intended to transfer authority over public education hiring practices from the state governments to the federal government, where administration officials believed themselves to be in a stronger position to negotiate with the national teachers' union, the National Coordinator for Education Workers, or SNTE by its Spanish acronym, about changing hiring practices. The Education Reform Bill was unsurprisingly met with strong opposition from SNTE, stalling many of the planned reforms (Canedo, 2016) . The subsequent police repression of teacher strikes and protests led to at least nine protesting teachers being killed, which sparked even Educational reforms and the expansion of state-run social benefits were contrasted with industrial privatization in a sector that had previously been deemed off limits for policy makers. A year after taking office, Peña Nieto signed an amendment to the Constitution allowing for the privatization of Mexican energy assets. This was followed in August of 2014 by a series of bills that Peña Nieto signed into law aiming to reform the energy sector in Mexico. Within the reform package, state-owned oil monopoly Petroleos Mexicanos, or PEMEX, opened its doors for private investment. The reforms allowed PEMEX to manage certain projects on its own, while taking on investment in the form of partnerships and contracts for other projects, such as offshore oil drilling. While PEMEX continues to own all hydrocarbon assets underground, the reform laws and constitutional amendment allow for private oil exploration and oilfield development, as well as the ability to transfer ownership of extracted oil and natural gas once it has been removed from the ground (Castilla & Prakash, 2014) . The reform laws establish specific protocols for determining royalties and tax rates for all projects, including those managed solely by PEMEX (Negroponte, 2014) . Through the reforms, the Federal Government assumes the responsibility of paying for PEMEX's workers' pensions in exchange for raising the retirement age from 55 to 65 (Negroponte, 2014) . The relevance of these reforms to national planning strategy runs far deeper than merely selling off assets of a state-run company.
Although the long-term impacts of Mexico's energy sector reforms are still manifesting themselves, through the privatization of PEMEX, as well as with reforms to other components of the nationwide electricity grid, Peña Nieto has set a direction for Mexico's overall development. That direction is a balancing act between environmental concerns on both a local and global scale, land ownership and tenancy concerns, and financial pressures from corporate interests as well as from Mexicans looking for jobs (Negroponte, 2014 & Parraga, 2018 ). Yet at the same time, exploration and extraction of natural gas, which has a smaller carbon footprint as crude oil, may prove to be an intermediary step toward green energy. Facilitated by the reform laws, Mexico can take such a step forward through foreign and private investment and expertise (Lajous, 2014) . In either case, Peña Nieto's administration aims to make electricity and energy cheaper in Mexico. The high price of electricity in Mexico, when compared to similar economies around the world, is cited as a major impediment to industrial job growth (Lajous, 2014) . Peña Nieto's policy stance is that privatization is necessary to overcome a history of monopolized energy production that has slowed technological advances and price competition. By developing energy infrastructure through private investment, the administration envisions a more industrially competitive nation. With Mexicans heading to the polls in July of 2018, it remains to be seen whether the direction Peña Nieto has set for the nation is a vision that is shared by the majority of constituents.
Conclusion
Mexico has had a rich and colorful history, and national planning has played a major role in the economy for almost a century. Whereas the initial import-substitution industrialization in the country focused too narrowly upon specific sites, later export-led industrialization has attended only to the global market. The former was more attentive to the immediate environment, while the latter is becoming more attentive to the world. However, the conceptualization of national planning processes must simultaneously recognize the dynamics of the economy at community, regional, national, continental, and global scales. After nearly nine full decades of promoting the positivistic search for political order and the dream of economic progress, the institutionalized national planning process of Mexico has evolved. With the American presidency now in the hands of Donald Trump, this resilient process is likely to face significant short-term challenges...
